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Abstract
We develop a New Keynesian DSGE model with heterogeneous agents to investigate 
how the shadow financial system affects macroeconomic activity and financial 
stability. In the adopted framework, regulated commercial banks finance small firms 
through traditional business loans and exert costly effort to screen the projects they 
finance. Shadow financial intermediaries finance large firms, provide short-term 
lending to commercial banks, and are engaged in the secondary market for loans. In 
this market, commercial banks originate asset-backed securities under moral hazard 
to exploit regulatory arbitrage. Shadow intermediaries purchase these loans from 
commercial banks under adverse selection. In general equilibrium, this set of 
externalities is not internalized by the financial system. We show that a macroprudential 
authority may successfully mitigate the externalities by activating caps to both the 
leverage ratio and the securitization ratio in the traditional banking sector. Such policy 
actions are effective in safeguarding financial stability, dampening aggregate volatility 
and improving welfare.
1 Introduction
The financial turmoil triggered by the recent sub-prime crisis has revealed the flaws 
of the pre-crisis regulation framework designed for traditional financial intermediaries. 
Moreover, it has put under the spotlight the functioning of the universe of non-bank 
financial institutions operating within an unregulated or only lightly regulated 
environment – thereby known as “shadow banking or shadow financial intermediation 
system”.1,2
The growing concerns pertaining to the vulnerability of the financial system in the 
aftermath of the 2007-2008 crisis have led authorities worldwide to devise a regulatory 
response aimed at mitigating undesirable consequences of under-capitalization and 
liquidity shortages in the banking system. Such response, known as Basel III, 
introduced more stringent (counter-cyclical) capital requirements and liquidity 
1 In this paper, we intend the concepts of “shadow banking system” and “shadow financial intermediation 
system” interchangeably.
2 Shadow financial intermediation can be defined as the set of activities consisting of the origination and 
acquisition of loans by non-bank financial intermediaries, the assembly of these loans into diversified pools, 
and the financing of these pools with external debt, much of which is short term and supposedly riskless 
[Gennaioli et al. (2013)].
CAPTURING MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION EFFECTIVENESS: A DSGE APPROACH 
WITH SHADOW INTERMEDIARIES
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requirements for credit institutions, and other provisions to be applied to insurers.3 
The additional costs induced by the burden of the financial compliance has raised 
new concerns for regulatory authorities, as it may create further incentives for banks 
to shift part of their activities outside the regulated environment, thereby increasing 
the size of the shadow sector even further.4
This paper contributes to the theoretical understanding of the implications of the 
shadow financial intermediation system interacting with both the financial system as 
a whole and with the real economy.
The role of the shadow financial system and its connected securitization activity has 
long been recognized as controversial. While securitization certainly adds economic 
value by allowing risk-tranching, it may also undermine the correct mechanism of 
incentive compatibilities and can create other information problems [Ashcraft and 
Schuermann (2008)]. Recently, it gained a renewed interest due to a surge in 
securitization transactions registered in the post-crisis period.
After a major contraction in the wake of the financial crisis, in fact, there has been a 
resurgence of risk-pooling transactions in Europe through both traditional and 
synthetic securitization, driven by banks’ need to lower capital ratio requirements by 
exploiting regulatory arbitrage opportunities.5
To visually inspect the connection between regulatory arbitrage and securitization 
activity, the left panel of Chart 1 shows the developments of securitization during the 
3 Basel III represents the third wave of the new international regulation framework. Basel I introduced capital 
adequacy ratios for credit institution. Basel II allowed banks to use internal risk-based measure to weight 
the different types of of assets held in their portfolio.
4 This type of behavior follows the so-called “regulatory arbitrage hypothesis”. As described by Farhi and 
Tirole (2017), the regulatory arbitrage view includes two possible sub-views. In the first sub-view, retail 
banks evade capital requirements by providing liquidity support off-balance sheet to shadow intermediaries. 
The second sub-view involves capital requirement “evasion” by shadow intermediaries, which face no 
capital adequacy requirement and yet receive public assistance.
5 This behavior is also boosted by the regulatory actions aimed at relaunching sound securitization 
practices and free up capital for economic growth through simple, transparent and standardized 
securitization. In particular, following the slow recovery of the securitization market in Europe, as part 
of the Capital Markets Union (CMU) action plan to increase investment in the EU, the European 
Commission proposed in 2015 a regulatory framework consisting of two components: i) a regulation 
on securitization that would require due diligence, risk retention and transparency with a set of 
criteria to identify simple, transparent and standardized (STS) securitizations, and ii) an amendment 
to the rules relating to the capital treatment of securitizations for banks and investment firms. Under the 
proposal, a securitization receiving an STS designation would be eligible for certain lower capital 
requirements. As initially proposed, however, the STS designation would apply only to traditional (i.e., 
true-sale) securitizations, and not to synthetic securitizations, although institutions retaining senior 
positions in certain synthetic securitizations backed by an underlying pool of loans to small and 
medium-size enterprises that meet certain strict criteria would be permitted to apply the lower capital 
requirements. See Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 of the European Parliament and the Council, 
7 December 2017. 
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implementation of the regulatory framework “Basel III”. The dark line represents the 
stock of loans that have been securitized or otherwise transferred and derecognized 
from the balance sheet of the euro area Monetary and Financial Institutions (MFIs), 
while the light line represents the stock of securitized loans reported in the asset 
side of Financial Vehicle Corporations (FVC) engaged in traditional securitization 
(see Chart 1).
The risks related with a rapidly growing shadow financial sector as a consequence of 
regulatory arbitrage have been emphasized, notably, by the President of the European 
Central Bank, Mario Draghi, in the following statement:
“The crisis demonstrated that the shadow banking system can itself be a source 
of systemic risk, both directly and through its interconnectedness with the 
regular banking system, leading to a build-up of additional leverage and risks. 
Therefore, enhancing supervision and regulation of the shadow banking system 
in areas where systemic risk and regulatory arbitrage concerns are inadequately 
addressed is important.”6
In this paper, we further contribute to the debate on the role of securitization through 
the lens of a New Keynesian dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (NK-DSGE) 
model with shadow financial intermediaries, which includes macroprudential 
regulation as a tool for macroeconomic stabilization in the presence of such 
intermediaries.
In the model, financial intermediaries operating in the traditional banking sector 
– which we refer to as commercial banks – can originate risky loans and can finance 
such loans both with own resources and with interbank credit obtained from the 
shadow financial system. These loans are granted solely to small firms. This 
assumption is made to replicate structural granular characteristics of the euro area 
economy. As shown in the right panel of Chart 1, in fact, small firms find it more 
difficult relative to large firms to access the capital market, thus relying on traditional 
business loans as the prevalent source of external finance.7
Within our framework, loans are subject both to idiosyncratic risk and to aggregate 
risk. This entails that loan default may occur in equilibrium. Crucially, commercial 
banks may exert costly screening effort to reduce, although without eliminating, the 
failure probability of the projects they finance.
6 Statement by Mario Draghi, Chairman of the Financial Stability Board to the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee, Washington, DC, 24 September 2011. 
7 The data are elaborated from the ECB SAFE 2017 (Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises in the 
euro area).
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Commercial banks are the originators of asset-backed securities which are purchased 
by the shadow intermediaries. This is an empirically important feature in the euro area 
as securitized loans represent about two-thirds of total FVCs’ assets.8,9 The decision 
to securitize a pool of loans made by the commercial bank is the result of the interplay 
of two key factors present in the model, both exerting upwards pressures on the 
incentives to securitization, i.e. moral hazard and regulatory arbitrage. Moral hazard 
arises as a consequence of the possibility for commercial banks to sell off their loans 
to shadow intermediaries and invest the proceeds towards an alternative investment 
opportunity. Regulatory arbitrage provides an additional motive to securitize loans 
due to both the direct and indirect costs associated with holding capital idling 
unproductively. These two factors lie at the root of the commercial bank’s incentives 
to resort to securitization.10
The impact of securitization is twofold. On the one hand, it allows banking capital 
to accumulate faster and provides an efficient market-based channel to unchain 
the traditional banking sector from risky and potentially non-performing loans. 
On the other hand, securitization generates an externality that is not internalized 
by shadow intermediaries: the acquisition of securitized loans occurs under 
adverse selection, due to the asymmetric information problem stemming from 
the uncertainty of the payoff incorporated in the securitized loans when the 
transaction on the secondary market is cleared. Were shadow intermediaries 
isolated entities from the rest of the economy, the pass-through of risk entailed 
by securitization would indeed result in an effective conduit of risk immunization 
of the traditional banking sector. Instead, in our model and close to reality, 
shadow intermediaries are interconnected both with the banking sector and with 
the productive sector, as they sell credit contracts both to commercial banks 
and to large firms. As a consequence, any transfer of risk from the traditional banking 
to shadow intermediaries may feed back into the former sector through the 
interbank market and into the productive sector through corporate lending. The 
 8 See the report “EU Shadow Banking Monitor”, No. 2, May 2017, by the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB).
 9 A more detailed analysis about the size of the shadow banking system in the euro area, with comparisons 
to the United States, can be found in Malatesta et al. (2016).
10 To be more precise, the model features several chained financial frictions that contribute to shock 
amplification. These frictions lie at the root of the commercial bank’s incentives to resort to 
securitization. The first is a regulatory friction implying the inability for the regulatory framework to map 
each individual asset to the appropriate risk weight. This entails that there exist two investment 
opportunities whose differences in their risk/return profile do not require a different treatment within 
the regulatory framework. Banks exploit this “inefficiency” by arbitraging between the two investment 
opportunities (namely, selling business loans and taking on the outside investment option) to 
benefit of the higher return while keeping unchanged the regulatory burden. One way to rationalize 
this behavior could be the strategic use of internal models by banks to generate more favorable 
risk weights. Further, there is an asymmetric information problem underlying business loans: banks 
finance risky projects whose return is subject to ex-ante uncertainty and exert costly screening to 
limit the probability of incurring in non-performing loans. The interaction of these frictions plays an 
important role in driving our results.
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interconnectedness plays a role in creating a tension between the two productive 
sectors, making the relative availability of credit in each of these sectors 
dependent on shadow intermediaries and on the propagating effects of 
securitization.
We consider a possible macroprudential policy regulation that aims at 
safeguarding financial stability and mitigating the undesirable effects of 
securitization while preserving its potential benefits. Therefore, commercial 
banks are compelled to conform to a double layer of regulation: the leverage 
ratio, which imposes the maximum level of exposure towards small firms for a 
given level of internal capital, and the securitization ratio, which limits the 
maximum fraction of loans that can be securitized and passed on the secondary 
market. We find that the activation of these macroprudential policy instruments 
is effective in smoothing business cycle volatility following the realization of a 
variety of shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 
lays down the structure of the model and describes the optimizing behavior of 
the economic agents. Section 4 studies the quantitative implications and reports the 
impulse response functions to different type of shocks. Section 4.3.5 studies 
the role of heterogeneous firms in the transmission mechanism of shocks. Section 5 
presents macroprudential policy as macroeconomic stabilization tool. Section 6 
concludes.
SECURITIZATION ACTIVITY IN THE EURO AREA AND FIRM FINANCING GAP
Chart 1
SOURCES: In the left panel, the time series (in logs) are obtained from the ECB SAFE 2017 (Survey on Access to Finance of Enterprises). “ABS MFI” 
Series key: BSI.M.U2.N.A.A20D.A.1.U2.2240.Z01.E) and “ABS FVC” Series key: FVC.Q.U2.N.T.A40.A.1.A1.0000.00.Z01.E). The right panel displays 
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2 Relation to existing literature
At a higher level, our model is linked to several papers which develop general 
equilibrium models with a shadow financial sector. For example, Verona et al. (2013), 
develops a DSGE model and find that central banks ignoring the shadow sector may 
wrongly anticipate the effects of monetary policy. Our model differs from the above 
in the fact that we focus on macroprudential policy rather than monetary policy 
transmission. Plantin (2014) develops a banking model to show that tightening capital 
requirements may spur a surge in shadow banking activity that leads to overall larger 
risk of the formal and shadow banking institutions. With this model, we have in 
common the underlying result that regulating shadow banking activities may be 
desirable from a welfare perspective, although we differ in the modeling approach as 
we develop a fully-fledged New Keynesian DSGE model. Other worthwhile examples 
are Ordóñez (2017) and Begenau and Landvoigt (2017). These two papers have in 
common the result that shadow banking may potentially be welfare improving 
making the aggregate banking system safer. In common to these papers, our paper 
also entails a positive effect of the shadow banking system through securitization 
that allows increasing aggregate efficiency, but differs in the overall result, since the 
presence of regulatory arbitrage in our model reduces bank screening and ultimately 
leads to a lower overall welfare.11
In spirit, the closest to our paper is Goodhart et al. (2012), who construct a two-period 
model to show that given many complex interactions between the various agents, no 
single regulatory tool is sufficient to offset the many distortions arising from defaults. 
Our result is in line with this conclusion in the fact that financial regulation in the form 
of two regulatory tools – such as caps to the leverage ratio and the securitization ratio – 
in the traditional banking sector is welfare improving when such tools are activated 
simultaneously. As for the modeling approach of the financial sector, our paper closely 
follows Meh and Moran (2015), who study how leverage regulation effects may depend 
on the existence of shadow intermediaries. However, our model departs from their 
work in at least two dimensions: first, we include the securitization ratio to the set of 
financial regulatory tools; second, to closely represent structural characteristics of the 
European economy, our model features two types of firms: firms that get access only 
to bank loans (which we refer to as SMEs) and firms with access to the capital market to 
issue debt to the shadow sector (which we refer to as large firms). Unlike their model, 
our model presents a vertically integrated production sector with small firms producing 
the intermediate good, which is entirely used by large firms as input to produce the 
wholesale good. Moreover, we include and endogenous monetary policy rule and 
nominal rigidities in retailer’s sector in the form of price stickiness.12
11 More recently, Farhi and Tirole (2017) show how prudential regulation must adjust to the possibility of 
migration toward less regulated spheres.
12 Some recent work shows that bank lending to SMEs firms is an important channel for the euro area 
monetary policy transmission especially for the impact of Quantitative Easing [Funk (2019)]. The distinction 
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A key feature of our model is the inclusion of regulatory arbitrage considerations. The 
regulatory arbitrage hypothesis has been investigated from several point of views. For 
example, Houston et al. (2012) study regulatory arbitrage empirically in a cross-country 
setting, although without a specific reference to the shadow financial system, finding 
strong evidence that banks do transfer funds to markets with fewer regulations. In 
addition, Acharya et al. (2013) analyze asset-backed commercial paper conduits, 
which experienced a shadow-banking run and played a central role in the early phase 
of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. They show that regulatory arbitrage was an 
important motive behind setting up conduits. Le Leslé and Sofiya (2012) have 
undertaken a comprehensive review of risk weights, pointing to possible explanatory 
factors for the differences across jurisdictions. Similarly, Mariathasan and Merrouche 
(2014) found evidence of a strategic use of internal models by banks to generate 
desired risk weights. Our model lends support to the above literature. However, we 
differ from them as to the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to focus on the 
macroeconomic and financial stability implications of regulatory arbitrage through 
the lens of a New Keynesian dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (NK-DSGE) model 
with several layers of financial frictions, heterogeneous firms, and macroprudential 
regulation as a tool for curbing the effects of financial and regulatory inefficiencies.
3 The model
The economy consists of households, large firms (LF), small and medium enterprises 
(SME), commercial banks and shadow intermediaries, capital producers, retailers 
and an authority conducting monetary and macroprudential policy.
Households provide labor in a competitive labor market and use their labor income 
to finance consumption and to save. As they cannot directly invest in capital, 
households deposit their savings either with traditional banks at the gross nominal 
interest rate RD or with shadow intermediaries at the gross nominal interest rate 
RSB. Small firms produce an intermediate good, which is entirely used in the 
production process of large firms as input for producing a wholesale good. To 
introduce price inertia in a tractable manner, we introduce retailers that transform 
the wholesale good at no cost into a final consumption good.
Firms obtain funding through a financial sector made of commercial banks and 
shadow intermediaries. Both types of banks are connected through the interbank 
between small and large firms also finds support in other related research showing that small firms are 
severely credit constrained. Other contributions are those of Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006), Ferrando 
and Griesshaber (2011), and Artola and Genre (2011) and those studies pointing to the importance of the 
contribution of small and medium enterprises to aggregate fluctuations, such as Moscarini and Postel-
Vinay (2012), Gabaix (2011), and Acemoglu et al. (2012), inter alia.
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market in which shadow intermediaries lend to commercial banks. Commercial 
banks use interbank credit, tIB , together with own bank capital, 
B
tK , to finance risky 
projects originated by small-medium enterprises (SMEs). On the contrary, shadow 
intermediaries solely finance large corporate firms (LF). There are two sources 
of information frictions in the financial sector. On the one hand, moral hazard of 
commercial banks may arise when an exogenous alternative investment opportunity 
materializes; in this case, the commercial bank may find it optimal to pool its loans into 
asset-backed securities (ABS) and sell them on the secondary market to shadow 
intermediaries, regardless of whether or not such loans are ultimately going to be 
successful. On the other hand, shadow intermediaries, which are involved in credit 
transformation, buy pooled loans on the secondary market under adverse selection 
as the payoff of the loans incorporated into the ABSs is unknown in advance. Beyond 
ABS, shadow intermediaries lend funds to large firms by purchasing their issued 
debt, tB . Therefore, we distinguish the financing channels of both large and small 
firms, while connecting them indirectly through the interbank market. Finally, shadow 
intermediaries finance their activity by issuing liabilities. Scheme 1 summarizes the 
financial relationships of our agents through their balance sheet positions.
3.1 Households
Households are risk-averse and infinitely lived. They derive utility from a consumption 
good and disutility from labor. The consumption good acts as a numeraire. Their 
income is derived from renting labor to producers at the competitive real wage WH. 
The available income is used to finance consumption, hold deposits with financial 
intermediaries and pay the tax bill. Their preferences are described using an internal 
habit formulation common in recent DSGE literature as in Smets and Wouters (2002), 
AGGREGATE BALANCE SHEET POSITIONS OF FIRMS, BANKS AND HOUSEHOLDS
Scheme 1
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Christiano et al. (1997). In particular, households maximize the expected present 
discounted value of their utility:
      1tt H Ht t t 0 H t t 1
t 0
N
C , N log C h C ,
1



             [1]
where HtC  is non-durable consumption at time t, tN  is labor supply, h 0 is the 
coefficient governing the intensity of habit in consumption, 0   is a scaling 
parameter for hours worked and 0   is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor. 
When choosing the allocation of their savings, households can decide to direct their 
savings either towards a commercial bank in a deposit account or a shadow 
intermediary in a custody account. The former can be seen as a traditional current 
account that offers an interest rate on deposits redeemable at any time. We abstract 
from deposit insurance. We later characterize the financial contract ensuring that 
households have an incentive to engage with commercial banks. In contrast, the 
funds deposited at the shadow intermediary can be seen as a financial investment, 
for example in money-market funds or assimilated financial products offered by 
non-bank financial institutions.13 To model the household investment decisions, we 
follow Dotsey and Ireland (1996) and Meh and Moran (2015) and assume that 
households are distributed along a unit interval, with position  i 0,1  identifying a 
typical household. Commercial banks are located at point 0 and shadow 
intermediaries at point 1. If savings are deposited with a commercial bank, the return 
is taxed by the government, so that the after-tax return is  D btR 1 t , with bt  the tax 
rate and DtR  being the gross nominal interest rate on deposits. If savings are allocated 
to a shadow intermediary, households incur an ex-ante quadratic cost equal to:
   21 1 ii i
       ,  0    and  1 0  , [2]
and earn a gross nominal interest rate SBtR .
When maximizing their utility function, households are subject to a sequence of 
budget constraints:
             H b D SB Ht t t t t t t 1 t t tC D i 1 i 1 t R i R 1 i D i W N T ,                [3]
where tD  is the amount of deposits,   is a binary function that equals 1 when savings 
are allocated to commercial banks and 0 when savings are allocated to shadow 
intermediaries; Ht tW N  is labor income and tT  is lump-sum transfers, which includes 
profits from the retail sector, capital good producers and the banking sector.
13 As argued by Ferrante (2018), we can think of the shadow intermediaries deposits as the set of instruments 
that over the past years allowed investors to channel funds into this parallel (shadow) sector, such as 
money market mutual funds (MMMFS), which in normal times were perceived basically as risk-free assets.
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The first order-condition with respect to consumption reads as:
 Ht H tH H H H
t t 1 t 1 t
1 1
h
C hC C hC 
         
  [4]
The first-order condition with respect to labor yields the labor supply:
  Ht t tW N     [5]
The first-order condition with respect to deposits, if allocated to a commercial bank is:
  H H b Dt H t t 1 t1 t R ,       [6]
while if allocated to a shadow intermediary is:
   H H SBt H t t 1 t1 i R ,       [7]
where t   is the rational expectation operator conditional on information available 
in t , H0 1    is the household’s subjective discount factor and Ht  is the Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the household’s budget constraint. By equating both first-
order conditions with respect to deposits we obtain the indifference condition of the 
household located at position i*:
    H H SB b Dt H t t 1 t tR 1 ti* R           [8]
Aggregating across households, the supply of funding for banks and shadow 
intermediaries is respectively:
 
i*
B
t t
0
D D   [9]
 
1
SB
t t
i*
D D   [10]
3.2 The financial sector
The financial sector is made of a continuum of risk neutral commercial banks and 
shadow intermediaries.
Commercial banks carry out a traditional financial intermediation activity, which 
consists of pooling together resources collected from depositors and the interbank 
market (from shadow intermediaries) to finance risky projects of SMEs.
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Commercial banks can increase the likelihood of a project to be successful by exerting 
costly effort in monitoring SMEs’ projects. However, when an exogenous investment 
opportunity materializes, they may decide to sell a portion of their loans to shadow 
intermediaries in the form of ABS. The activity of commercial bank is subject to a 
twofold macroprudential regulation: on one hand, the maximum leverage ratio 
governing the bank’s financial exposure towards SMEs; on the other hand, a cap to 
the securitization ratio. Shadow intermediaries, on the contrary, are non-bank financial 
institutions whose main activity consists in attracting resources from households and 
use such resources to operate on the secondary market for loans, provide short term 
finance to commercial banks and finance large firms. The next subsection provides 
further details on the financial sector and lays down its modeling approach.
3.2.1 Commercial banks
Commercial banks are financial intermediaries whose role is to attract deposits from 
households and to finance SMEs’ projects.
The balance sheet of the commercial bank is given by:
 S B Bt t t tL K D B ,I    [11]
where StL  is the amount of loans extended to the SME, 
B
tK  is commercial bank 
capital, BtD  are deposits received from households, and tIB  is interbank credit.
14
The project carried out by the entrepreneur of the small firm is subject to an 
idiosyncratic shock  S 0,R  , which determines the amount of raw capital of time 
t  that turns into effective capital in time  t 1 . We assume that a project is successful 
with probability t p , otherwise it reveals to be a non-performing loan.
The financial contract between the commercial bank, depositors and the shadow 
intermediary
We now lay out the financial contract between lenders (households and shadow 
intermediaries) and the borrowers (commercial banks). Following the set-up of Meh 
and Moran (2015), we assume that commercial banks have the ability to screen the 
14 The credit relationship between the two financial intermediaries has not to be intended as loans from the 
shadow financial intermediary to the commercial bank such as “repos” contracts, or any other form of 
collateralized debt issued by the commercial bank. Rather, they are simply money-like deposits from the 
shadow intermediary to the commercial bank, for which collateral is not required. In Section 3.2 we set up 
the financial contract for deposits between the lenders (households and the shadow intermediary) and the 
borrower (the commercial bank), which ensures that the shadow bank has incentives to engage in 
the deposit contract without neither requiring collateral nor deposit insurance.
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projects they finance. Screening at intensity t  allows the bank to identify and 
eliminate projects with low probability of success.15
Moreover, exerting effort t  allows the bank to acquire private information about the 
idiosyncratic shock S . However, screening entails a cost, which is proportional to 
the value of the loan: St t tc L   , with c 0 .
The project carried out by the small-medium firm is assumed to be successful with 
probability tp  and subject to an aggregate return, t 1V  . In this case, the loan in which 
the commercial bank invested in generates revenues:
 S L St 1 t 1 t tL V R L ,   [12]
where LtR  is the share of return accruing to the bank, and:
  kt 1 t 1 t 1V R 1 Q       [13]
is the aggregate return of capital.16 In contrast, with probability  t1 p  the project is 
unsuccessful, and the loan turns out to be a non-performing loan, S t 1L 0  .
The commercial bank might occasionally receive an outside investment opportunity 
that brings an excess positive return. In this case moral hazard may arise. We denote 
the probability of the outside investment opportunity occurring by l and the excess 
return attached to it by   1. A bank affected by this positive shock will want to sell 
its loan commitment before it comes to fruition and divert the freed capital resources 
towards the more profitable alternative investment, . If the expected return of the 
outside opportunity is higher than the expected return on loans, the bank decides to 
liquidate a fraction of loan commitments to shadow intermediaries through 
securitization on a secondary market for loans. The timing of the events is such that, 
first, loan arrangements with SMEs take place, then the commercial bank decides 
on the screening intensity and learns about the quality of the project. Conditional on 
both that quality and on the outside opportunity received, it decides whether to keep 
the loan commitment until it comes to fruition or sell it on the secondary market to 
shadow intermediaries.17 In doing so, however, commercial banks must comply with 
a regulation constraint of the type:
15 Note that pt is to be intended as the average probability across small firms’ projects. However, in this 
representative firm setup this distinction can be disregarded.
16 The term Rkt 1 is the return on capital,  is the rate of capital depreciation and Qt 1 is the price of capital, 
which is pinned down in the capital producers’ problem in Subsection 3.3.5.
17 In our model, the commercial bank resorts to securitization to move off-balance sheet a fraction of loans that 
is already in the portfolio and acquired on the primary market. In this sense, the timing is such that securitization 
comes after loan origination. In principle, it could also be possible the bank selling a loan on the secondary 
market before its acquisition on the primary market. However, we abstract from short selling in this model.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 165 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 37
 t 1
S
t
ABS
L
   [14]
Trivially, upon the arrival of a better investment opportunity the bank would like to 
securitize as much as possible given the higher expected return attached to the 
outside option. This entails that the above constraint always holds with equality 
and allows us to rule out this constraint occasionally binding when solving the 
model.
As described in Meh and Moran (2015), due to the private nature of the bank’s 
screening effort, an agency problem between the bank and other stakeholders arise. 
The bank might choose to screen less intensively than agreed; this action would 
result in a lower probability of success of the projects and reduces the likelihood that 
depositors obtain the return pledged by banks. In addition, the private nature of the 
two types of shocks introduces adverse selection in the secondary market for loans. 
As a consequence of these information rigidities, the profit maximizing behavior of 
the bank is subject to the financial contract ensuring that all the agents have 
appropriate incentives to engage in the borrowing-lending relationship. The contract 
is such that by the end of period the commercial bank pays a fraction HtR  to 
households and a fraction IBtR  to the shadow intermediary. Therefore, total return 
equals the sum of each agent’s returns H IB Lt t t tR R R R .  
We assume that commercial banks are owned by households and managed by 
risk-neutral bankers, whose objective is to maximize the expected return on 
lending:
 
S H L B
t t t t t t
e L S
t t 1 t t
L ,R ,R ,D ,p ,E
max     p V R L ,  [15]
subject to the incentive compatible, technology and resource constraints detailed below:
   L e S ABS St t 1 t t t t t t tR V p 1 l L ABS c Q L      [16]
 e S H B Dt t 1 t t t tp V L R D R   [17]
 e S HB IBt t 1 t t t tp V L R IB R   [18]
 B B S St t t t t tK D IB c L L      [19]
 L H HBt t tR R R R    [20]
 
L D IB
t t tR , R , R 0  [21]
  tp   t  [22]
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t
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L
  [23]
Condition [16] ensures that the bank has an incentive to screen at the agreed 
intensity. Condition [17] is the depositor’s incentive to engage in the financial contract 
with the commercial bank, which states that the share of expected return accruing 
to the depositor for a project that is successful with probability tp  must be at least 
equal to the bank’s cost for households deposits. Similarly, condition [18] is the 
participation constraint of the shadow intermediary on the interbank market with 
the commercial bank, so that the shadow intermediary is willing to participate in the 
financial contract as long as the expected return of the project covers the commercial 
bank’s cost of interbank funding. Condition [19] is the bank’s resource constraint 
indicating its ability to bear the project’s total cost. Equation [20] states that the 
returns on the projects accruing to the household, the shadow intermediary and 
the commercial bank must sum up to total return.
To solve the financial contract [15]  [23], we first start by assuming that the regulation 
constraint binds and plug it into [16] holding with equality. This returns the incentive 
compatibility constraints of the commercial banks that depends on the securitization 
ratio parameter.
Solving for the lending rate delivers:
   L t tt ABS et t t 1
c Q
R
p 1 l V 
     [24]
By using [20], the household’s share of total return is given by:
   H HB t tt t ABS et t t 1
c Q
R R R
p 1 l V 
       [25]
Further, plugging [25] into the participation constraint of depositors [17] holding with 
equality delivers:
   
e
HB S Bt t 1 t t
t t tD ABS e
t t t t 1
p V c Q
R R L D ,
R p 1 l R V


       
 [26]
which reveals the willingness of households to deposit their savings with the 
commercial banks.
Finally, introducing [26] into the resource constraint [19] and rearranging, the following 
bank capital to-asset ratio can be obtained:
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  
B e
HBt t t 1 t t
t tS D ABS e
t t t t t t t 1
K p V c Q
1 c R R ,                        
Q L Q R p 1 l V


           
 [27]
which can be rewritten as the leverage ratio:18
 
  
S
B t t
t B
et HBt t 1 t t
t tD ABS e
t t t t t 1
Q L 1
K p V c Q
1 c R R
Q R p 1 l V


             
 [28]
For probability of success, we assume a functional form of the type:
    t t tp p ,       [29]
where p  is the steady state probability of success of the project, t  is the screening 
effort and   its steady-state value, and p 0   is the elasticity of the screening intensity.
The evolution of commercial bank capital
To derive an expression for the evolution of the aggregate banking net worth available 
in the economy, it is necessary to account for the four possible scenarios that have 
been realized, which depend on the profitability of the loan commitments as well as 
the arrival of the alternative investment opportunity. The four scenarios and their 
respective outcomes in period t 1  are:
1 The bank had a successful project with probability tp  but did not get the 
outside opportunity occurring with probability l and did not issue any ABS. 
The joint probability of such an event is  t 1p 1 l  . Accounting for this 
probability, the bank’s net worth in this scenario is:
  B L S1,t t 1 t t tK p 1 l V R L    [30]
2 With probability t 1p l  the bank received a profitable outside opportunity 
and securitized the loan (regardless of whether it is successful or not) to 
invest the proceeds at the rate . The net worth in this case is:
 B ABS L2,t t 1 t t t tK p l V R ABS    [31]
18 The leverage ratio of commercial banks arises endogenously in the model. We impose this constraint to 
bind on a regulation-level when we conduct the policy experiment by forcing a cap on endogenous 
leverage.
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3 With probability   t 11 p 1 l   the bank did not received a profitable 
alternative investment opportunity but sold nevertheless the loan (because 
of the knowledge that it was ultimately going to be a failure). In this case 
the net worth is:
   B ABS L3,t t 1 t t t tK 1 p 1 l V R ABS     [32]
4 With probability  t 11 p l  the bank received a profitable alternative 
investment opportunity and sold the loan (which was going to fail in any 
case) to invest the proceeds at the more convenient rate of return .  In this 
scenario, the rate of return is given by:
  B ABS L4,t t 1 t t t tK 1 p l V R ABS    [33]
Taking into account these four possible scenarios, the aggregate level of banking net 
worth available in the economy reads as:
 B B B B Bt B 1t 2t 3t 4tK K K K K ,        [34]
where B  is the fraction of surviving banks at the end of each period. The above 
expression can be expanded with the regulation constraint binding in equilibrium 
and the aggregate evolution of bank capital reads as:
      B ABS L S Bt B t 1 t 1 t 1 t t 1 t tK 1 p 1 l l p 1 l V R L W               [35]
The above relation implies that securitization through   exerts a positive effect on 
the accumulation of banking capital.
3.2.2 Shadow intermediaries
Shadow intermediaries are financial institutions that operate outside the traditional 
banking system. The shadow sector is assumed to be competitive.
Shadow intermediaries are not burdened with regulatory costs, thus their activities 
are not covered by a safety net. Their activity consists in a classic intermediation 
function, carried out by collecting deposits from households to extend both financial 
and non-financial corporate lending, and a function of credit transformation 
participating in the secondary market for loans. While interbank lending can be 
seen as a short-term funding through which shadow intermediaries optimize their 
liquidity management, corporate bonds are relatively more illiquid assets but more 
profitable in the long run. We assume that there are quadratic management costs 
involved with investing either in the interbank market and in corporate loans, so 
that:
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    SB IB2 2B IBt t t tP B  and P IB .2 2
   19 [36]
This choice is in line with studies in the macro-finance literature, such as Andrés 
et al. (2004) or Chen et al. (2012), and the micro-banking literature, such as Freixas 
and Rochet (2013). Given that shadow intermediaries face a trade-off between 
liquidity and return when making the portfolio decision, we capture this imperfect 
substitution by assuming that SB IB   . Unlike commercial banks, shadow 
intermediaries finance their activity by issuing liabilities to households on which they 
offer a variable gross return, SBR .
The timing of the events is such that the funds obtained by the shadow intermediary 
from household at time t are employed to extend credit to commercial banks and 
large firms, and to pay the respective portfolio adjustment costs. The resource 
constraint at time t is thus:
    SB IB2 2SB L ABSt t t 1 t t t t t tD R V ABS B IB B IB2 2
       [37]
Condition [37] states that the household’s deposits – which are the only source of 
funding for shadow intermediaries – are used to purchase asset-backed securities 
on the secondary market, to provide corporate and interbank lending, and to pay the 
respective portfolio adjustment costs. At time t + 1, the shadow intermediary receives 
the revenues both from corporate bond investment, interbank lending and the payoff 
incorporated into the ABSs, and pays back household’s funds plus interest.
Thus, the flow-of-funds is given by:
 B IB L SB SBt t 1 t t 1 t t 1 t t tB R IB R R V ABS D R      , [38]
with    t t t tp l / p l 1 p    .
Both [37] and [38] can be combined to obtain the profit function, which is maximized 
by the shadow bank by choosing tB , tIB  and tABS . Therefore:
 
t t t
B IB L
t t t t t t 1 t
B ,IB ,ABS
max B R IB R R V ABS         [39]
    B IB2 2L ABS SBt t 1 t t t t t t tR V ABS B IB B IB R2 2
        
  [40]
19 We rule out corner solutions such as the interbank market investment set to zero by the shadow bank as 
it would require interbank credit and corporate loans to be perfect substitutes. However, the two portfolio 
adjustment costs entail imperfect sustainability between corporate bonds and “interbank investment” 
(deposits), ensuring an interior solution.
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The first order-conditions to maximize profits are:
  B B SBt t tR 1 B R    [41]
  IB IB SBt t tR 1 IB R    [42]
 ABS tt SB
t
P
R
  [43]
It is worthwhile noting that the price of asset-backed securities depends positively 
on both the probability of success and the probability of the alternative opportunity, 
and negatively on the interest rate on shadow intermediaries’ deposits. The price of 
asset-backed securities, in turn, affects both the interbank rate and the interest rate 
on corporate loans through SBtR .
3.3 The production sector
The production side is characterized by two types of representative firms owned 
by entrepreneurs. In line with empirical patterns observed in the euro area, we 
assume that production is strongly characterized by the presence of small and 
medium enterprises, which typically resort to traditional business loans to finance 
their activity. In our model, these firms produce the intermediate good, which is 
used by large corporate firms as input to produce the wholesale good. Retailers 
are in charge of transforming the wholesale good into the final consumption 
good. In contrast to small and medium enterprises, large firms benefit of a greater 
variety of external funding. Most importantly, they can have full access to the 
capital market financing. Our vertically integrated economy linking small and 
large firms in a production chain is a key feature of the model and plays an 
important role in the transmission mechanism of shocks originating both in the 
real and the financial sectors, and it represents a tractable way to study the real 
effects of macroprudential regulation.
3.3.1 Large firms entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs manage large firms and operate in a perfectly competitive environment 
to produce output that is sold to monopolistically competitive retailers.
The technology of the large firm is described by a Cobb-Douglas production 
function that employs capital, labor and the intermediate good produced by SMEs 
as inputs:
      L S S L1L L S Lt t t t t ,Y A K Y N     [44]
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where tA  is the aggregate technologic shifter, 
S
tY  is the intermediate good input, 
L
tN  
is labor input, L  and S  are the elasticity of output to capital and to the intermediate 
good, respectively. At the end of each period, large firms purchase capital LtK  to be 
used in the production process in the subsequent period at the real price tQ . Capital 
acquisition is financed by a combination of internal and external finance, so that the 
demand of external finance is defined by:
 L Lt t t tB K ,Q NW   [45]
where LtNW  denotes large firm’s net worth. The interest rate charged by shadow 
intermediaries to large firms on funding tB  is denoted with 
B
tR .
3.3.2 Debt contract
The debt contract signed between the large entrepreneur and the shadow 
intermediary follows Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christiano et al. (2007), which is 
based on the costly state verification framework (CSV) of Townsend (1979). In 
particular, the entrepreneurial activity involves risk. The entrepreneur of the large 
firm is thus exposed to a private idiosyncratic shock, denoted with L , which affects 
the intertemporal transformation of capital, such that L Lt t 1K K   . The shock is 
assumed to be L  InN(,), whose parameters are chosen in order to obtain an 
expected value of one and to match the desired steady state default rate on loans. 
As customary, we assume that a fraction ( L1  ) of large entrepreneurs exits at the 
end of each period. Thus, the probability that an entrepreneur will survive is L . This 
assumption ensures that large firms’ net worth is never sufficient to self-finance new 
capital acquisition. Each period they issue debt, tB  to finance their desired investment 
expenditure in excess of net worth.
As Bernanke et al. (1999) have shown, due to a demand-side friction, an external 
finance premium results from the financial contract signed between the entrepreneur 
and the financial intermediary that maximizes the payoff to the entrepreneur subject 
to the required rate of return of the lender. It is shown that given parameter values 
associated with the cost of monitoring the borrower, characteristics of the distribution 
of the entrepreneurial returns, and the expected life span of firms, the implied 
external finance premium depends on the entrepreneur’s leverage ratio. Dib (2010) 
implemented a likewise financial contract in a framework with a banking sector 
wherein the marginal external financing cost is equal to an external finance premium 
plus the gross prime lending rate. The size of this markup depends on the ratio of the 
market value over firm’s net worth. Hilberg and Hollymayar (2011) also incorporate a 
similar framework, allowing for the possibility of bubbles in the price of capital. We 
rule out the possibility of bubbles in the price of capital; the expected gross return to 
holding a unit of capital from t to t + 1 is given by:
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 LKt tQ
t
t 1
R 1 Q
R ,
Q 
    [46]
and the markup is:
 
LQ L
t 1 t t
B L
t t
R Q K
R NW

      
 [47]
This means that the expected marginal external financing costs equal the expected 
marginal return on capital. The external finance premium   LL Lt t tQ K / NW   depends 
on the firm’s leverage ratio, a relation that embeds financial acceleration as put 
forward by and the size of which is governed by the parameter L 0. 
Moreover, the demand for entrepreneurial labor is found by equating the marginal 
product with the wage:
   L LtL tL
t
Y
1 W  
N
    [48]
Combining [44] with [48] yields a difference equation for the aggregate net worth 
position of large firm:
 
   
        L S L S
Q L
t t 1 tL Q L M L L
t L t t t t t 1 t t 1L
t 1 t 1 t
1L S L
L t t t t
dF R Q K
NW R Q K Q K NW
Q K NW  
1 A K Y N

 
 
   
              
  

 [49]
Note that the policy rate, Mt , is considered as the risk-free interest rate in the 
economy, under the assumption that firms may always invest into exogenously given 
safe assets that pay a risk-less rate that equals the policy rate.20
3.3.3 Small firms entrepreneurs
A continuum of firms produces the intermediate good in a perfect competitive 
environment according Cobb-Douglas production function:
    S S1S S St t t 1 tY A K N ,   [50]
20 Furthermore, the model is closed by assuming also that the interbank rate, Rt
IB equals the policy rate, Rt
M, 
in equilibrium as commercial banks can also borrow at the central bank’s discount window.
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where tA  is an aggregate technology shifter common to both large and small firms, 
S
tN  is labor input, S L    denotes the share of the capital input with respect to the 
intermediate good.
Entrepreneurs managing small firms have no net worth available to start production. 
As such, they apply for loans to commercial banks to finance their risky projects. 
The amount of loan equals the market value of capital:
 S St t tL Q K  [51]
Capital transformation is subject to idiosyncratic risk and to aggregate risk. The 
idiosyncratic shock  S 0,R   implies that the project generates S St 1 tK RK   if 
succesful, while if unsuccessful St 1K 0. 
Profit maximization delivers the following demand for inputs:21
   Stt S S
t
Y
W 1 , 
N
    [52]
  S SK tt S S
t 1
Y
r
K 
   [53]
3.3.4 Retailers
We assume that retailers of mass one have some monopoly power and set prices in 
a staggered manner as in Calvo (1983). Scattered price adjustment implies that 
prices of some goods differ for firms that periodically adjust their prices, which 
implies differences in demands for these goods and consequently in labor demand 
across firms. We assume a continuum of retailers of mass 1, indexed by z, who 
purchase the wholesale goods from large firms at price wtP , differentiate them at no 
cost into  tY z , and sell  tY z  at the price  tP z .  Final goods are:
 
/ 11
f 1
t t
0
Y Y (z) dz

    
 
 , where 1.   [54]
Given this aggregate output index, the price index is:
 
1/11
1
t t
0
P P (z) dz

    

 , [55]
21 We assume that the wage rate is equalized across the two sectors, thus Wt
S  WtL.
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so that each retailer faces an individual demand curve of      ft t t tY z P z / P Y  .
Each retailer chooses a sale price  tP z  taking wtP  and the demand curve as 
given. Using the standard Calvo (1983) pricing mechanism pricing mechanism, a 
randomly selected fraction of retailers  P1   can adjust their prices while the 
remaining fraction P  does not adjust. Denote with  tP* z  the “reset” price and 
with     t k t t k t kY* z P* z / P Y     the corresponding demand. The optimal  tP* z  
solves:
 
   tk t t,k t kP
t k t kk 0
P* z X
Y* z 0,
P X


 
              [ [[56]
where t,k  is the household’s discount factor and tX  is the markup of final over 
wholesale goods, which in steady state equals  / 1 .   Profits  t t tF 1 1/ X Y   are 
finally rebated to households.
Due to the nominal rigidity, the aggregate price level evolves according to:
    11 11 *t P t 1 p tP P 1 P            [57]
3.3.5 Capital producers
Capital good firms are owned by households. They operate in a perfectly competitive 
environment and use a linear technology to produce new capital both from old 
capital and with investment goods. While old capital can be transformed at no cost 
into new capital, the conversion of investment goods into new capital is subject to a 
convex adjustment cost.
Capital producers maximize the following objective function:
 
t
2
i t
t t t
I t 1
I
max    Q I 1 1 I
2 I 
         
 [58]
The aggregate capital stock evolves according to:
 
 
2
i t
t t 1 t
t 1
I
K 1 K 1 1 ,I
2 I 
            
 [59]
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 175 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 37
where   is the depreciation rate and investment is subject to a quadratic adjustment 
cost with i  denoting the parameters of such costs.
Maximization of this problem delivers the following capital supply:
 
2 2
i t t t t 1 t 1
t i t t 1 i
t 1 t 1 t 1 t t
I I I I I
Q 1 1 1 1 ,
2 I I I I I
 

  
                                   
  [60]
which is the standard Tobin’s Q equation relating the price of capital to marginal 
adjustment costs, with i 0   governing the size of the investment-adjustment 
cost.
3.4 Monetary policy
We set an endogenous monetary policy rule in which the central bank controls 
the risk-free interest rate according to a Taylor (1993) rule with interest-rate 
smoothing:
    ryr
1
M M M t t
t t 1
,t 
Y
 R R R ,
Y
  


              
 [61]
with ,t  being the monetary policy shock.
3.5 Aggregation and market clearing
First, we turn to the aggregation in investment projects. As discussed in Section 2.3, 
there are three cases in which the bank securitizes loans. In these cases, the bank 
redeploys the capital freed up by this transaction towards a technology that produces 
final goods in the current period. Thus, aggregating all the cases, there is an extra 
portion of consumption goods created by the redeployment of capital, which sums 
up to:
    ABS L St t 1 t 1 t t 1 t 1l 1 p 1 l P V R L             [62]
As for the other aggregate variables, these are simply given by the weighted average 
of the corresponding variables for each type of firm. Thus:
  S Lt t tK K 1 K     [63]
  S Lt t tN N 1 N     [64]
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  S LK K Kt t tR R 1 R     [65]
Moreover, market clearing for goods requires that:
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2 I 
              
 [66]
3.6 Exogenous perturbations
The exogenous shocks follow an AR(1) process:
    t A ,t 1 A,tlog A log A ,   
    B Bt t 1 ,tlog log ,       
    t t 1 ,tlog log ,     
 [67]
    t t 1 ,tlog log ,       
with  j 0,1   and j,t  is i.i.d. with mean 0 and standard deviation j  and with 
Bj A, , ,      identifying the shock to technology, leverage ratio, securitization ratio 
and to monetary policy, respectively.
3.7 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is characterized by a sequence of endogenous variables: Ht{C , 
H
t , 
S
tN , 
L
tN , tN , tD , 
S
tY , 
S
tK , 
S
tL , 
L
tY , tNW , tI , tK , t , BtK , tABS , tIB , tp , t , tW , DtR , SBtR , LtR , 
IB, 
SK
tR , 
LK
tR , 
M
tR , 
B
tR , t , tQ , t t 0V } , and exogenous processes for shocks satisfying 
the optimality conditions as well as technology and resource constraints.
4 Quantitative analysis
4.1 Parameterization
The model parameters are set to match key quarterly features of the Euro area. We 
set   0.025 to match an annual rate of depreciation of 10% of capital with respect 
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to output. We set L  0.43 for large firms and S  0.25 for SMEs implying an 
elasticity of labor (1  L)  0.55 and (1  S)  0.75, respectively. The weighted 
average elasticity of capital with respect to total output is therefore   0.33 implying 
an aggregate weighted elasticity of labor with respect to output of (1  )  0.66. 
These differences capture the idea that small firms are characterized by a higher 
labor-to-capital ratio than large firms. Euro area data suggest a fraction of SMEs 
over total firms in the range (0.95  0.99) depending on definitions; thus we set 
it to   0.95 implying a share of large corporate firms (1  )  0.04. The share 
of SME’s output used in large firms production reflects the average share of 
intermediate good employed across sector based on EU data. In particular, 
Eurostat states that the EU-27’s wholesaling of intermediate goods sector 
(NACE Group 51.5) consists of approximately one in seven of all wholesaling (NACE 
Division 51) enterprises; thus, we set S  0.15. The size of the elasticity parameter 
L  0.05 and the survival rate of entrepreneurs, L  0.05, follows from Bernanke 
et al. (1999).
In line with Gerali et al. (2010), the discount factor of the households is set 
H  0.9943 in order to obtain the average of the steady-state interest rate on 
deposits (average of both commercial and shadow intermediaries) slightly above 
2 per cent on an annual basis, in line with the average monthly rate on M2 
deposits in the euro area from the years 1998-2009. The weight on leisure  is 
chosen to match a steady-state work effort of households of 0.3; the labor supply 
elasticity,   1, follows from Christiano et al. (2005).
The monetary policy rule is calibrated with conventional values adopted in the 
literature. In particular, r  0.69 and π  1.35 and y  0.26. As for the exogenous 
perturbations, we assume that each type of shock follows the same AR(1) stochastic 
process j,t  jj,t1 + ej,t, with j  A, B ,  and where A identifies the technology 
shock, B   the shock to the bank’s leverage ratio,  the shock to the securitization 
ratio,  identifies the monetary policy shock. We set j  0.95 and ej  1. As for 
the banking sector, the survival rate of bankers B  0.95 adopts the value set by 
Gertler and Karadi (2011). Following Meh and Moran (2015), the parameter  is 
set to 1.01, which indicates that capital redeployed generates just enough 
excess return to be valuable. The probability of the outside investment 
opportunity to occur is kept to l  0.25 in the analysis. The leverage ratio B    is 
set to 5.0 in the baseline exercises, but we also explore the interval  B 3,6  . As 
for the securitization ratio, we set to     0.5 in most scenarios, but we also 
experiment for values in the interval   [0.4, 0.6] to examine the effects of 
loosening this regulatory tool. The range of values chosen for the leverage ratio 
and the securitization ratio is the state-space in which equilibrium determinacy 
is ensured in all the scenarios we examine.
Table 1 summarizes the parameterization.
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4.2 Steady state
We present the steady state obtained numerically for key macroeconomic variables 
under standard parameterization.
4.3 Impulse responses to shocks and business cycle amplification
In this section, we provide the results of the model under different types of shocks. 
We illustrate how business cycle amplification is affected by the heterogeneity of 
firms and by regulation in the financial sector. We take the technology shock as a 
benchmark, as it represents one of the main drivers identified by the DSGE literature 
on the business cycle.
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4.3.1 Technology shock
We consider a technology shock as the benchmark to describe the main transmission 
mechanism at work in the model. In response to a positive technology shock, both 
small and large firms would like to produce more and increase their demand for 
loans. In absence of regulation constraints on the leverage ratio, commercial banks 
would accommodate this higher demand and increase their exposure towards small 
firms. The obligation to comply with leverage regulation, instead, forces banks to 
raise own capital in order to increase loan supply, setting the stage for regulatory 
arbitrage. To allow faster capital accumulation after the shock, banks increase the 
intensity at which they screen projects so as to limit capital disruption stemming 
from risky and likely non-performing loans.
This raises the success probability of the projects, which has a direct, positive, effect 
on the price of asset-backed securities. The latter depends, in contrast, negatively on 
the gross interest rate on shadow intermediaries’ deposits, which increases after the 
technology shock. Since the increase of the interest rate on shadow intermediaries 
deposit is stronger than the increase of , the price of asset-backed securities falls. 
It is important to stress that the fall of the price of securitized loans on the secondary 
market reflects the higher opportunity cost that banks incur when liquidating loans 
after having increased the intensity of costly screening effort.
The possibility opened by the presence of a secondary market for loans, thus, 
allows banks to redeploy capital, to accumulate net worth, and to increase loans. It 
is worthwhile noting that this channel, although active, exerts a limited force due to 
the securitization cap. The cap limits the ability of commercial banks to securitize 
loans on the secondary market and thus the severity of the regulatory arbitrage 
externality.
STEADY STATE OF SELECTED MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES ECONOMY
Table 2
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4.3.2 Financial shock
The financial shock consists of a one per cent decrease to the probability of receiving 
the alternative investment opportunity for the commercial bank. Chart 3 shows the 
impulse response functions.
Most of the transmission mechanism holds as in the technologic shock. The key 
mechanism at work still goes through the incentives for commercial banks to screen 
and thus to influence the probability of the projects to be successful, through banking 
capital accumulation and the consequent credit availability for small firms. Intuitively, 
a negative shock to the probability of obtaining an alternative investment opportunity 
reduces capital redeployment opportunities for commercial banks. This has a direct, 
negative effect on banking capital accumulation. Because of the leverage regulation 
ratio, the fall in banking capital needs to be accommodated by a reduction in the 
amount of projects financed (to keep complying with regulation), which translated in 
a fall of projects screened and consequently of their probability of success. This has 
TECHNOLOGY SHOCK. BASELINE IMPULSE RESPONSES OF SELECTED KEY MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Chart 2
NOTE: The leverage ratio is set to țB = 5, and the securitization ratio to ț = 0.5.
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a direct effect on the price of ABSs (as prescribed by condition [43]), which increases 
to reflect the lower opportunity cost faced by commercial banks when securitization 
on the secondary market for loans takes place.
4.3.3 Regulation shock
We consider two types of regulation shocks. This first one is a one percent tightening 
in the leverage regulation B , while the second shock is a one percent tightening of 
the securitization ratio .
A tightening of regulation, put in practice by lowering leverage in the traditional 
banking sector, exerts a positive effect on the screening effort by commercial banks. 
The severity of the moral hazard behavior is dampened and the probability of 
incurring into non-performing loans decreases. In fact, a tighter leverage ratio 
regulation implies that banks need to increase own capital to keep loans supply 
FINANCIAL SHOCK. IMPULSE RESPONSE OF SELECTED KEY MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES CONDITIONAL
ON THE REALIZATION OF THE ADVERSE SHOCK TO THE PROBABILITY OF THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT 
OPPORTUNITY
Chart 3
NOTE: The leverage ratio is set to țB = 5, and the securitization cap at ț = 0.5.
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unchanged. Thus, increasing screening is the only way to ensure capital accumulates 
faster. Exerting costly effort to ensure that project failures are less likely makes them 
less willing to sell loans on the secondary market. Therefore, the quantity of ABS 
drops, as well as the price of ABS to reflect the higher opportunity cost faced by 
commercial banks. On impact, the supply of loans drops as a consequence of the 
partial ability of commercial banks to meet the regulation constraint solely by 
increasing the screening effort. As a consequence, the adjustment to the regulation 
ratio passes through the reduction of loans to small firms as well. Importantly, the 
presence of large firms dampens the fall in capital demand, as the downward pressure 
on its price triggered by small firms makes more convenient to purchase the capital 
good to be employed in the large firm’s sector. This mechanism sustains investment 
and the demand of intermediate good by large firms.
A similar dynamic holds for a tightening in the securitization ratio, which makes 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities less likely for commercial banks. The consequent 
limited capital redeployment opportunities force commercial banks to increase 
REGULATION SHOCK. IMPULSE RESPONSE OF SELECTED KEY MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES CONDITIONAL
ON THE REALIZATION OF A 1% TIGHTENING OF THE LEVERAGE RATIO FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS
Chart 4
NOTE: The capital requirement is initially set at 20% (or leverage țB = 5), and the securitization cap at ț = 0.5.
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screening and reduces the positive effects on banking capital accumulation 
induced by securitization. Banking capital drops, so that commercial banks cut on 
the loans supply to small firms, feeding downward pressures on the price of the 
investment good. The initial drop of small firms’ investment, however, is counteracted 
by the increase in large firm’s demand of capital good, which increase their loan 
demand thereby sustaining the demand of intermediate good and aggregate 
output.
4.3.4 Monetary policy shock
A tightening of monetary policy has a direct effect on the net worth of large firms as 
the monetary policy interest rate is used as the risk-free interest rate. Thus, an 
increase in the policy rate has a negative impact on large firms’ net worth, which 
worsens their ability to finance capital purchases via internal finance. As a 
consequence, large firms’ demand of credit to shadow intermediaries increases, 
REGULATION SHOCK. IMPULSE RESPONSE OF SELECTED KEY MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES CONDITIONAL
ON THE REALIZATION OF A 1% TIGHTENING OF THE SECURITIZATION RATIO
Chart 5
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which increases the lending rate and improves the intermediation prospects of 
shadow intermediaries. This attracts more deposits towards shadow intermediaries, 
but also to commercial banks due to the fact that the latter increase their interest 
rate to keep households engaging in the financial contract. To cope with the increase 
in the cost of funding, commercial banks increase screening to improve the likelihood 
of project to be successful. Thus, as described above, the price of ABSs falls to 
reflect the higher opportunity cost when securitization on the secondary market for 
loans takes place.
4.3.5 The role of firm heterogeneity
In this subsection, we explore the role played by firms heterogeneity in the transmission 
and amplification mechanism of shocks.22 We start the analysis by assuming a drop in 
22 We leave to a next version possible quantitative experiments that relax nominal rigidities in order to assess 
their specific contribution to business cycle amplification.
MONETARY POLICY SHOCK. IMPULSE RESPONSE OF SELECTED KEY MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES CONDITIONAL
ON THE REALIZATION OF A 1% TIGHTENING OF MONETARY POLICY
Chart 6
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the fraction of SMEs from 95% (as in the baseline parameterization) to 70%, conditional 
on the realization of a favorable productivity shock. Chart 7 shows the respective 
impulse response functions. It is worth noting how the presence of small-medium 
enterprises generally brings an amplification effect in response to the technology 
shock, as shown by the more volatile solid line than the dotted line. Moreover, the 
share of SMEs also affects the magnitude of the financial variables due to sectoral 
inter-linkages mainly working through the ability of banks of accumulating capital and 
extending loans, as well as by securitization incentives incorporated in the financial 
contract. Similar results are obtained when changes take place in the parameter S , 
that is when changing the intensity at which the intermediate good produced by SMEs 
is employed by large firms as input in the production process. The intuition underlying 
the increasing volatility when the importance of SMEs increases rests in the presence 
of riskier projects of SMEs, which may be non performing loans for the commercial 
banks. The effects of financial frictions, such as the costly screening intensity 
IMPULSE RESPONSE OF SELECTED KEY MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES CONDITIONAL ON THE REALIZATION 
OF THE PRODUCTIVITY SHOCK 
Chart 7
NOTE: The leverage ratio is set at țB = 5 ț = 0.5, and the share of SMEs at Ȧ = 0.95 (solid line) and Ȧ = 0.7 (dotted line).
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interacting with moral hazard, and the default probability of projects in the SMEs’ 
sector make the whole economy more vulnerable to aggregate shocks due to the 
inter-linkages in the production chain as well as in the financial sector.
5 Macroprudential policy and welfare
To obtain a quantification of the effectiveness of the macroprudential policy tools, 
we study the effects of different policy regimes on output volatility and welfare. To 
this end, we first compute output volatility for each combination of the parameters 
representing the two macroprudential policy tools (i.e., caps to the leverage ratio 
and the securitization ratio). The results are graphically reported in Chart 9 over the 
state-space parameterization that ensures equilibrium determinacy.
IMPULSE RESPONSE OF SELECTED KEY MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES CONDITIONAL ON THE REALIZATION 
OF A 1% TIGHTENING OF THE LEVERAGE RATIO 
Chart 8
NOTE: The share of SMEs is set at Ȧ = 0.95 (solid line) and Ȧ = 0.7 (dotted line).
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As it can be observed, loosening simultaneously both macroprudential policy tools 
dramatically worsens the volatility of output. The positive analysis conducted in 
Chart 9 suggests that when the banking sector is highly leveraged in a context of a 
loose securitization regulation, a macroprudential regulator may successfully 
induce macroeconomic stabilization by tightening both banking leverage and 
securitization.
To assess this point from a normative point of view, we conduct welfare analysis 
following the approach found in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) or, more recently, 
in Wolff and Sims (2017).
For the purpose, we define a recursive formulation of as social welfare as:
  tt 0 t t t t t 1
t 0
welfare C , N ,



          [68]
where  t t tC , N  is the households felicity function defined in Section 3.1 and  is 
their subjective discount factor. We then solve the model by performing a second 
order approximation around the non-stochastic steady-state. When solving the 
model, we include [68] as equilibrium condition and analyze how Wt behaves when 
changing simultaneously the two policy parameters.
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY AND OUTPUT VOLATILITY CONDITIONAL ON THE REALIZATION OF A POSITIVE 
TECHNOLOGY SHOCK 
Chart 9
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 188 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 37
The result of this welfare exercise is reported in Chart 10, which shows that tightening 
securitization is generally welfare improving.
In light of these results, some further considerations are warranted. The presence of 
trade-offs is a key aspect of the model. Such trade-offs are generated by the 
interaction of several financial frictions and lead to two channels of transmission: 
the screening channel and the securitization channel. Within the model, the effect of 
policy interventions is ultimately determined by the joint effect of these channels. 
Securitization generally worsens welfare because the screening effect dominates 
the securitization effect. To be more precise, in order to take on the alternative 
investment opportunity, the bank has two ways of raising funds. First, the bank can 
use screening in order to improve the likelihood of the firm’s project to be successful 
thereby increasing banking capital accumulation. Second, the bank can generate 
revenues by selling loans. When the bank opts to sell loans through securitization, it 
abandons the first channel, screening. This exacerbates the moral hazard problem 
with depositors (i.e. the bank screens less than agreed in the financial contract). 
Lower screening leads to higher non-performing loans, while leverage remains 
constant due to the substitution of loans with the outside option. Although the outside 
option carries a slightly higher return, this is not sufficient to compensate the loss of 
banking capital accumulation resulting from higher non-performing loans due to less 
screening. The resulting situation is that the banking sector has the same leverage 
but higher non-performing loan levels than it would have had if it continued screening. 
Although securitization helps to take advantage of the alternative option, this is the 
reason why it leads to an externality. More specifically, it amplifies moral hazard and 
eases regulatory arbitrage. For the same reason, placing a cap on securitization 
WELFARE
Chart 10
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forces banks to resort to more screening for increasing funds thereby improving the 
likelihood of projects to be successful.23
6 Concluding remarks
The recent financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession have changed the 
way economists think about the importance of the shadow financial system and its 
interaction with the rest of the economy. Only recent standard DSGE models have 
started to incorporate a fully-fledged financial sector with banks assumed to be the 
only financial intermediary.
In this paper, we take a step forward by bringing shadow financial intermediaries into 
a standard NK-DSGE model. The objective is to study the pass-through of shocks 
between the real sector and the financial sector within a heterogeneous agent model 
economy in which small and large firms are vertically linked in a production chain. 
Small firms’ risky projects are financed by commercial banks, whose behavior may 
be subject to moral hazard that induces them to securitize loans and sell them to 
shadow intermediaries upon the arrival of a more remunerative investment alternative. 
Large firms’ projects are financed by shadow intermediaries, which also provide 
interbank credit to commercial banks. Macroprudential policy is imposed both as a 
limit to the leverage ratio in the traditional banking sector and as a cap to the fraction 
of loans that can be securitized. The adopted normative analysis suggests that 
loosening the limits to securitization and to leverage ratio in the banking sector may 
be harmful for financial stability as it dramatically increases the size of output 
volatility. The welfare analysis confirms that containing leverage and securitization is 
welfare-improving following a technology shock.
The first key result is that macroprudential policy helps reducing the severity of the 
moral hazard problem by inducing banks to increase the screening intensity of 
the projects they finance. The possibility of securitization helps limiting the drop of credit 
potentially available to small firms resulting from tight regulation. As shown by the 
banking capital accumulation equation, in fact, higher securitization increases bank 
capital and therefore the potential availability of credit supply to small firms. Moreover, 
securitization allows the pass-through of risk of potentially non-performing loans 
23 Clearly, the effects of these trade-offs rely on our modeling framework and crucial parameters. One 
important parameter in shaping these results is the return of the outside option (). If this parameter were 
high enough, the securitization channel would generate higher gains than costs. Nevertheless, the outside 
investment opportunity is an asset whose excess return must be positive, but rather small, in order to 
receive the same regulatory treatment. For this reason, we refrain from performing exercises with higher 
values of this parameter since it would lead the asset to a different regulatory treatment.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 190 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 37
from the traditional banking sector to shadow intermediaries, generally more 
specialized in the management of risky assets.
However, if the moral hazard problem is very severe, resorting to securitization may 
ultimately result in a worsening of aggregate volatility due to feedback effects that 
are in place through the shadow financial intermediation system and impact the real 
economy through the financing channel of large firms. Shadow intermediaries, in 
fact, are interconnected both with the banking sector and with the productive sector, 
as they provide credit both to commercial banks and to large firms.
The transfer of risk from traditional banks to shadow intermediaries, that might be 
beneficial at a first glance, feeds back into the former sector through the interbank 
market and into the productive sector through corporate loans, making the effects 
of securitization controversial.
As shown by the impulse responses to a financial shock, an increase in the probability 
of banks to receive a better outside investment opportunity and, thus, a worsening of 
the moral hazard problem leads to a drop in the screening intensity, bank net worth, 
investment and output. A regulator might help smooth business cycle amplification 
and improve social welfare by implementing a set of macroprudential policy tools as 
a macroeconomic stabilization policy, whose simultaneity may be powerful. In 
particular, our results find that both macroprudential policy tools are effective in 
smoothing business cycle volatility and increase welfare following the shock. On the 
contrary, the simultaneous loosening of both limits undermines financial stability.
In our model, therefore, securitization offers potentially large benefits especially for 
targeting resources towards more efficient redeployment. However, they might come 
at the cost of higher volatility when the banking sector is already highly leveraged 
and in welfare costs. In these situations, tighter securitization caps together with 
limits to leverage ratio should be activated.
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